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THE STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
SOUTHERN RHODESIAN BASE MINERAL INDUSTRY, 1907 — 
GREAT DEPRESSION
By I. R. PHIMISTER*
The British South Africa Company was originally lured in 1890 to 
what became Southern Rhodesia in anticipation of discovering extensive gold 
deposits, but over the next two decades evidence of the region’s diverse 
mineralisation accumulated. Prospectors soon found deposits of asbestos, 
chrome, mica, copper, sheelite, wolframite, tin and antimony, to list but a few. 
Of the many minerals discovered, only the first two named achieved significant 
and relatively consistent importance between 1907 and the Great Depression 
and consequently discussion will centre almost exclusively on them.' Mica 
is examined briefly as an example of the lesser minerals and the general 
problems of profitability and marketability which their extraction entailed.
Geology naturally imposed its own basic constraints on base mineral 
mining. Unlike the characteristic occurrence of gold in small, scattered 
deposits, chrome and asbestos deposits were often extensive but this was some­
what offset by the fact that ‘their grade is also frequently low and poses 
difficult problems in mining.’2 Overall, base minerals shared with gold the 
unhappy distinction that compared
‘with similar deposits either in South Africa or other highly mineral­
ized areas in the rest of the world, [their] mining in Southern 
_ Rhodesia is frequently associated with greater technical uncertainty, 
while the margin of profit is often small in relation to the risks 
involved.’3
But geological and kindred mining problems were never as pronounced 
for chrome and asbestos as they were for gold, especially as some of the major 
deposits lent themselves to open-cast working and the quality of certain 
asbestos grades was amongst the best in the world.4
Much more serious were problems arising from Southern Rhodesia’s 
situation as a remote, land-locked country. The poor location of base mineral
* Assist. Lecturer in History, University of Rhodesia.
All archival references apply to the National Archives of Rhodesia. 
iFor the value of coal production, see Phimister, ‘History of Mining in Southern Rho­
desia to 1953’, University of Rhodesia, unpub. Ph.D. thesis, 1975. 
aDevelopment of the Economic Resources of Southern Rhodesia, Report of Advisory Com­
mittee, 1962, 354.
'sjbid
«N. H. Wilson, The Mining Industry of Southern Rhodesia (Salisbury, [1933?] ) 41.
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producers as regards world markets5 made it difficult to sell competitively in 
such arenas and aggravated the burden of freight charges which were often 
heavy in relation to the value of the bulkier minerals exported.6 The severe 
competition which the territory consequently encountered both in originally 
breaking into world markets and thereafter in consolidating and expanding its 
share, thus demanded powerful marketing organisation and a very low level 
of mining costs. A still more fundamental problem was the extreme vulnera­
bility of chrome and asbestos to overproduction and sharp price fluctuations 
contingent on changing world supplies and demand. This feature was further 
complicated by the system, at least in the chrome industry, of forward con­
tracts whereby it was necessary ‘for anyone catering for this market to be 
in a position to guarantee deliveries of specific tonnages. It follows that it is 
necessary to secure reserves of ore largely ahead of immediate rquirements.’7 
Moreover, unlike gold which was normally sold direct to banks for immediate 
payment, base minerals were sold overseas and the money received was often 
not available for up to six months.®
Taken together, these profitability and market constraints resulted in a 
structure for chrome and asbestos mining that was very different from that of 
the gold mining industry. Contemporary observers themselves pointed out 
that because of such constraints ‘it follows that only [large] capitalists can 
work base metals in this Colony.’9 With the exception of mica mining where 
profits were too low to attract the attention of large companies, small workers 
suffered not only from the immediate constraints contingent on asbestos and 
chrome production but also were squeezed and bought out by the predominant 
producers. Because of the tendency towards overproduction and resultant 
price fluctuations in the base mineral market, profit maximisation and relative 
price stability were best achieved, as in the diamond industry, through mono­
polistic10 (or near-monopolistic) control of both production and marketing. 
This imperative applied both within Southern Rhodesia and on a world scale. 
A Government report later blandly noted that it was
‘fortunate that the principal asbestos and chrome producers are 
closely associated with overseas interests, which give them access to 
powerful financial backing, the requisite technical knowledge and
sSouthern Rhodesian chrome faced severe competition from New Caledonia, Turkey 
and Russia; asbestos equally from Canada and Russia; most of these producers were 
more competitively placed in relation to world markets than Southern Rhodesia.
6Economic Resources of Southern Rhodesia, 352, 354.
7A8/1/10, Extract from letter [1920] received from the consulting engineer, Rhodesian 
Chrome Mines, Ltd. and Rhodesia Metals Syndicate, Ltd. 
eB.Lightfoot, ‘Base Metals of Southern Rhodesia’, Proceedings of the Rhodesia Scientific
Association, 1938, 35, 76. 
elbid.
^ ‘Monopolistic’ is used here to cover both ‘monopoly’ and the more frequent case of 
‘oligopoly’; for elaboration, see P.A. Baran and P.M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (Har- 
mondsworth, 1968).
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experience, and some assurance in regard to outlets for their pro­
ducts. The steady growth in production of the asbestos and chrome 
mines since their development . . . must be largely attributed to the 
close financial ties with the leading producers and traders of these 
minerals in world markets.’"
Initially, the discovery and development of the various chrome deposits 
was in the hands of a number of prospectors, small workers and companies, 
but the disadvantages of a plethora of local interests when faced with the 
difficulty of breaking into the world market were soon apparent. When, for 
example, the Bechuanaland Exploration Company first made enquiries about 
marketing its chrome production, it was advised by ‘a firm who apparently 
control about two-thirds of the trade . . . that for the next two or probably 
three years the Companies interested in Rhodesia will not be able to dispose 
of any large quantity of Chrome Ore owing to contracts having been made 
from New Caledonia, Turkey and other countries for forward delivery.’2 
In order to solve this marketing problem and also to ‘do away with possible 
ruinous competition’ the majority of important chrome producers and claim- 
holders in Southern Rhodesia were amalgamated in June 1908 to form the 
Rhodesia Chrome Mines Limited.'3
The much greater capital resources and control over production which 
the new group enjoyed, enabled it to fight its way into the world market. The 
manner in which this was done is best expressed in the words of one of the 
participants:
‘In the Chrome proposition, we fought the price steadily down from 
67s.6d. to 40s„ and then, luckily, the French owners of the New Cale­
donian proposition were satisfied that we should fight them to a 
standstill and offered to sell out. We formed a Company to acquire 
their property with a capital of £190,000 . . . Those interested in the 
Rhodesian chrome proposition found this large amount of capital, 
most loyal assistance being given by the British South Africa Com­
pany, which recognised the absolute necessity of acquiring the Cale­
donian proposition to safeguard the position of the Rhodesian. Had 
it not been for their foresight and strong financial support, the trans­
action might possibly not have been completed and the Rhodesian
" Economic Resources of Southern Rhodesia, 352.
taM 3/3 /9 /l, Secretary, Bechuanaland Exploration Company, to Secretary BSAC, 
l.vi.1906.
'3A3/17/10, Edmund Davis, to Secretary, BSAC, 11 .ii. 1915. Company interests which 
were amalgamated included Bechuanaland Exploration Co. Ltd., Willoughbys Con­
solidated, Matabele Proprietary Mines, Selukwe Gold Mining Company and Mashona- 
land Agency Ltd. The B.S.A.C. also had substantial holdings, as did Edmund Davis.
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chrome venture would have been strangled in the early days of its
existence.’14
Under the direction and control of Rhodesia Chrome Mines, chrome 
production thereafter expanded steadily, particularly during World War One, 
until by 1919 over thirty five thousand tons valued at £142,541 were exported.,s 
Production was almost doubled in the following year and, as before, the 
bulk of the output came from producers controlled by Rhodesia Chrome 
Mines.16 The onset of the post-war depression in 1921 seemingly caught the 
major chrome producers unprepared and prices slumped because of over­
production. In Southern Rhodesia the largest chrome mine temporarily closed 
down.17
With the recovery of world demand, Southern Rhodesian chrome output 
once again increased, this time to the point where it accounted for over half 
the total world production in 1929. Exports that year reached 293,000 tons 
valued at £675,000. Two years later, however, output had fallen to ninety 
thousand tons worth £224,000 and slumped again in 1932 to 17,298 tons.18 
This collapse, explained a report, was ‘due mainly to the world-wide depres­
sion’, but it also noted that the ‘greater part of the world’s production of 
chrome is in the hands of one control, which under present conditions may 
find it more profitable to handle other chrome rather than Rhodesian.’ The 
report rather lamely concluded that it had ‘no means of confirming or dis­
sipating this impression.’19
Confirmation for and explanation of ‘this impression’ lay in events 
which had come to a head some years earlier in 1928. Before that date 
chrome mining in Southern Rhodesia had been largely confined to the Selukwe 
area where the bulk of the mines were owned by Rhodesia Chrome Mines. 
A few smaller concerns also mined chrome, especially along the Great Dyke 
in the Umvukwes area, where production had commenced in 1918 in response 
to increased world demand occasioned by World War One. Although there 
were large deposits, chrome mining in the Umvukwes region prior to 1928 
was characterized by its small-scale and limted profitability owing to the lack
I4A3/17/8, Chairman, Charterland and General Exploration and Finance Company Ltd, 
to H.U. Moffate, 27.iii.1917.
'5Report of the Secretary for Mines for the year 1919, 5.
• sReport of the Secretary for Mines for the year 1920, 5.
’7A8/1/10, Mining Commissioner, Bulawayo, report for year ended 31.xii.1921; Report 
of the Secretary for Mines for the year 1921, 1, 5.
• eLightfoot, ‘Base Metals’, 77; Ottawa Conference, Report of the Committee appointed 
to investigate and report to the Government on certain matters relating to the natural 
resources and industries of Southern Rhodesia, their present position and future pros­
pects, and their relation to Empire and world trade, 1933, 5.
^Ottawa Conference, 5.
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of railway transport.20 It did not therefore pose any serious threat to the 
monopolistic control exercised by Rhodesia Chrome Mines.
But this position changed rapidly once construction began on a branch 
railway line to the Umvukwes area in early 1929. The railway meant that 
chrome in this region could be mined both extensively and profitably, a fact 
which had not been lost on Rhodesia Chrome Mines, then under the astute 
chairmanship of Sir Edmund Davis.21 In 1928, the African Chrome Mines 
Ltd., again controlled by Davis, was set up to purchase chrome properties 
and claims along the Great Dyke22 and so maintain overall control of chrome 
production within the Davis group. The Chrome Trust, as the two Davis 
companies were known, was not, however, able to block the purchase of a 
large number of chrome holdings by the powerful Chrome Corporation (South 
Africa) Ltd. This company had been formed under the auspices of Becker’s 
Trust and, with a capital of three hundred thousand pounds, was purchasing 
large chrome interests in the Lydenburg district of the Transvaal, as well as 
in Southern Rhodesia.23 So considerable were the Umvukwes purchases of 
the Chrome Corporation that Rhodesia Chrome Mines itself had to step in 
and supplement the buying undertaken by African Chrome Mines, by purchas­
ing the whole of the holdings of the Great Dyke Syndicate. The Rhodesian 
Mining Journal, aware that the ‘world’s output of chrome was controlled by 
the Chrome Trust, in which the Sir Edmund Davis group is largely interested,’ 
observed that ‘evidently the signs of coming competition from the large holders 
in the Umvukwe areas have to some extent forced its hand, and led to the 
acquisition of the Great Dyke Syndicate’s and other property.’24
Competition, of course, was not a prospect which those controlling the 
production and trade of chrome welcomed. The whole structure of the in­
dustry had been designed to eliminate, as far as possible, the consequences of 
vulgar ‘market forces’. Given these factors, it is thus highly likely that the 
Chrome Trust utilized the contraction in the world chrome market caused 
by the Great Depression to ‘shut out’ chrome produced in Southern Rhodesia 
and South Africa in order to throttle the Chrome Corporation. Declining 
world demand was in itself a compelling incentive to eliminate competition 
and this was achieved through the Chrome Trust’s access to chrome supplies 
outside of Africa. By early 1932, sufficient pressure had been exerted, and 
African Chrome Mines Limited were able to purchase the bulk of the shares
2°See, for example, Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works, on 
Mines, for the year 1928, 5-6; F. E. Keep, ‘The Geology of the Chromite and Asbestos 
Deposits of the Umvukwes Range, Lomagundi and Mazoe Districts’ Southern Rhodesia 
Geological Survey Bulletin No. 16 (Salisbury, [1930?]), 73-4.
2 ’Events leading up to this railway construction and the clash between Government and 
the railway/chrome owners are discussed in Phimister, ‘History of Mining’. 
zzThe Rhodesian Mining Journal, March 1932, 123.
23jf6id, August 1929, 317. 
z^Ibid, November 1929, 453.
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Like chrome, asbestos production in Southern Rhodesia ultimately came 
under the control of one powerful group. Asbestos was first worked in the 
Mashaba district from 1908 onwards but production only assumed significant 
proportions when world demand expanded during the war. This expanding 
in the Chrome Corporation.25 Monopolistic control of the world chrome trade 
was once again assured and this, together with a gradual easing of the de­
pression, allowed the recovery of chrome production in Southern Rhodesia, 
demand also provided the necessary stimulus for the development of asbestos 
deposits in the second major area, Shabani, and production commenced in 
1917.26 Claims and mines in both districts were originally owned by a variety 
of individuals and companies, some of whom also held important chrome 
interests. In the Shabani area the most important producers and claim-holders 
included Willoughby’s, the Bechuanaland Exploration Company and the 
African Asbestos Company, a subsidiary of the powerful Turner and Newall 
group. The latter company also operated in the Mashaba district, as did 
Victoria (Rhodesia) Asbestos Ltd., the Charterland and General Exploration 
and Finance Company and a number of small producers.27
The first movement towards amalgamation occurred in 1917 when the 
Rhodesian and General Asbestos Corporation Ltd. was registered ‘to acquire 
from the Charterland and General Exploration Co., Ltd., the whole of its 
interest and asbestos mining claims in Rhodesia, in addition to the properties 
and business of the Victoria (Rhodesia) Asbestos, Ltd.’28 Bechuanaland 
Exploration interests were apparently also included in the scheme. Combina­
tion was seen as one of the precautions necessary ‘to prevent a slump’ and 
those interested were accutely aware of ‘the benefit which has accrued to the 
country and those owning the chrome properties through similar steps taken 
in connection with the creation and safeguarding of a market for Rhodesian 
chrome ore.’29 Not only would amalgamation go a considerable way towards 
establishing
‘control of the Rhodesia asbestos trade . . . and, in the course of 
time,. . . build up a large industry but [it would also] create a name 
for Rhodesian asbestos in markets all over the world, as it is the 
only way to make a success of the venture and obtain a satisfactory 
return on the very large amount of capital which will have to be 
invested in the concern.’30
The London Board of the B.S.A. Company, which was itself financially 
25/fcid, March 1932, 123.
zeLightfoot, ‘Base Metals’, 76; The Shabanie Asbestos Mines, by the Staff of the African 
Associated Mines, Limited (Shabani, 1936), 1.
27Shabanie Asbestos Mines, 1; Rhodesian Mining Journal, December 1931, 708 
zsRhodesian Mining Journal, December 1931, 708.
29A3/17/8.
3°tbid.
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interested in the Rhodesian and General Asbestos Corporation, agreed to a 
proposal by that company’s backers to prohibit the pegging of further asbestos 
claims by outsiders in the Mashaba and Shabani districts, in order to strengthen 
monopolistic control. As the Board explained to their Southern Rhodesian 
Administrator, Chaplin, ‘this course will be both advantageous to the country 
and highly profitable to the Company but realise that it will meet with much 
local opposition which it is prepared to ignore unless you strongly advise it to 
refrain from this action.’3' Chaplin successfully objected to the proposed 
action on a number of grounds, chief of which was that reservation would be 
ineffective in view of the five thousand asbestos claims already in existence, 
and the Asbestos Corporation was advised to use the more conventional 
method of buying out smaller producers.32
By the end of the Great War, asbestos production in Southern Rhodesia 
was dominated by the Asbestos Corporation, the Turner and Newall sub­
sidiary and Willoughby’s Consolidated. At this stage, there was room for all 
as world demand continued to increase and the years 1919-20 were prosperous. 
In the latter year, asbestos production reached 18,823 tons valued at £459,572.33 
Asbestos, however, shared the general fate of base minerals during the 1921 
slump and all mines ‘practically ceased production and restricted their de­
velopment work.’34 Of the three major asbestos companies, Willoughby’s was 
the weakest and least able to face the prospect of over-production and declin­
ing prices and it subsequently sold its asbestos interests to the Asbestos Cor­
poration in 1924.35
The disappearance of Willoughby’s left the field in the grip of the 
Asbestos Corporation and Turner and Newall. While the former dominated 
production within Southern Rhodesia,36 Turner and Newall controlled the 
marketing of asbestos in Britain, where it manufactured crude asbestos into 
various industrial products, and also had asbestos interests in South Africa.37 
Conflict between two such powerful groups obviously would have been 
mutually damaging and in any case it seems that competition was more 
apparent than real. Before the Great Depression, both companies consistently 
paid high dividends38 and in particular had a common interest in securing a
3'Ibid, Cablegram from London, 2.iii. 1917.
32lbid cablegram to London, 4.iv.l917.
33Report of the Secretary for Mines for the year 1920, 6.
34Report of the Secretary for Mines for the year 1921, 1.
3sA. E. Hadley, Willoughby’s Consolidated Co. Ltd: 1894-1944 (London, [1944?],) 17.
36ln 1926, for example, out of a total asbestos production of 33,344 tons valued at 
£726,835, the Rhodesian and General Asbestos Corporation accounted for 26,032 tons 
valued at £604,422; see Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public 
Works, on Mines, for the year 1926, 3.
s7Keep, ‘Review of the Mining Industry of Southern Rhodesia’, Proceedings of the 
Geographical Society of South Africa, 1934 37, 29.
38Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 9, Second Session, Second Parliament, 
24.iv.1930, col. 1281.
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place for Southern African asbestos in the world market.
Sir Edmund Davis, who occupied a commanding position in the base 
mineral world,39 employed his customary blend of ruthless coercion to carve 
out a market for Southern Rhodesian asbestos exports. Davis described his 
method of operation in a letter to Moffat, the colony’s Minister of Mines, in 
1925:
‘As far as the asbestos position is concerned, you have no doubt 
heard that most of the Canadian Companies have suffered severely 
from the cutting of prices I have indulged in to obtain a preponderat­
ing position for Rhodesian asbestos in the World trade market . . . 
When I went to America they welcomed me with the statement that 
they had £600,000 to spend to knock Rhodesian asbestos out of the 
market. I d'd not then seen any of the people who were so anxious 
to spend this large amount but I sent back word to them that they 
could spend their £600,000 and they would find me in the market 
when they had finished doing so. To cheer them up I immediately 
cut the prices by 25% and have since cut them by an additional 
50%, with the result that they are now passing their dividends and 
that at Meetings of Shareholders they are referring to the insane 
competition amongst producers in cutting prices to obtain trade. 
There is no question of price cutting to obtain trade, but of price 
cutting to secure the only trade there is, as whatever the price is the 
trade will practically remain the same, and I have managed to secure 
for Rhodesia the bulk of the best class trade, which is the one on 
which a profit can be made.’40
But Southern Rhodesia faced competition not only from Canada but 
also from the Soviet Union, where asbestos production increased significantly 
in the late 1920s. Expanded Russian production apparently was in part a 
consequence of Davis’ price-cutting operations. In order to stay in production, 
Canadian producers had begun selling their short grades of asbestos below 
cost, while depending on sales of long fibres and crudes at higher prices for 
overall profits. Demand for crudes and spinning fibres, however, was lessened 
with the introduction of moulded brake lining and prices began to fall. As a 
result, there was fierce competition, especially by the Soviet Union, for the 
more lucrative long fibre market. To meet this fresh challenge, the Rhodesian 
and General Asbestos Corporation and Turner and Newall amalgamated their 
interests at the end of 1929, even as the Great Depression began to constrict 
the world asbestos market further.41
39 For the extensive and inter-locking company interests held by Davis in the 1930s, see 
D. J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia (Oxford, 1970), 138.
•»°H.Mss. LE3/1/1, Sir Edmund Davis, to H.U. Moffat, 21 .i. 1925.
4'Rhodesian Mining Journal, December 1931, 708-9.
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At the height of the depression, Davis claimed that without the amalgama­
tion ‘Southern Rhodesian asbestos production would have by now come to 
a complete standstill. . .  and all Rhodesian asbestos mines would have shared 
the fate of practically every asbestos mine in the world which is not allied 
to manufacturing interests.’'42 Turner and Newall’s manufacturing interests, 
combined with its monopoly of asbestos production in southern Africa and 
its marketing organisation in Britain, enabled it to reach agreement with 
the Soviet Union ‘in collaboration with the principal consumers in Europe, 
with a view to the stabilisation of the market on a basis satisfactory to all 
concerned. The upshot will eventually be that supplies of both the Russian 
and the Rhodesian commodity will be available for all buyers at favourable 
prices.’43 Monopolistic bargaining-power was thus able to secure exports 
worth over half a million pounds sterling for the Southern Rhodesian asbestos 
industry in 1933.44
Unlike chrome and asbestos production, mica mining was not sufficiently 
profitable to attract the attention of large companies and consequently re­
mained the preserve of individual smallworkers and small syndicates. Produc­
tion was largely confined to the Miami area of the Lomagundi district and 
first began shortly after World War One.45 Total output between 1919 and 
1932 rarely averaged more than £22,000 per annum and was considered to 
suffer ‘from ups and downs even beyond the hazards [to] which other base 
minerals’ were prone.4®
Smallworkers were attracted to mica mining because of the very 
small capital expenditure that was entailed; ‘little explosives are used, the 
mica being obtained chiefly by pick and shovel work.’47 Such a consideration 
was particularly enticing at a time when the price of explosives was rising 
rapidly,48 Minimal capitalisation, however, together with product’s limited 
profitability and marketing difficulties,49 required cheap labour. Many of 
these problems were shared by smallworkers mining chrome in the nearby 
Umvukwes area and both types of producer resorted to the customary pro­
cedure of cutting labour costs. In some respects, though, the lengths to which 
they went were extraordinary even by the standards of Southern Rhodesian 
mining.
‘The Miners who first opened up the [Mica] Fields’, observed a Govern­
ment official, ‘were men of little or no capital, and consequently could not
■»zS254, Edmund Davis, to J. W. Downie, 8.vi.l931.
*3Rhodesian Mining Journal, December 1931, 709.
4«Keep, ‘Review of the Mining Industry’, 29.
45Wilson, 62-3.
46Ibid, 63.
47M3/7/10/4, Inspector of Mines, to Secretary for Mines, 5.viii.l920.
4sSee Phimister, ‘History of Mining’.
49For this aspect and Government assistance to the mica miners, see, for example, Report 
of the Secretary for Mines for the year 1920, 2.
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afford to pay more than the minimum wage that a native would accept . . . 
[and further] large numbers of natives never received wages due to them.’50 
Mica producers also reduced expenditure on wages by ‘paying labourers in 
kind rather than cash.’51 But the most widespread method of cost minimisa­
tion was to employ children to grade and cut mica. On some mines, over 
twenty per cent of the workforce consisted of children who were paid between 
2s.6d. and 10s. per month.52 As far as the neighbouring chrome mines were 
concerned it was thought that the
‘Chrome Miners have laid themselves out to kill their labour supply, 
and have nearly succeeded in doing so. Non-payment of wages, 
piecework, Mine accidents53 are all factors which adversely affect 
their supply. Chrome Mining is an industry which is cut to the last 
penny and if by mis-management or mis-calculation a miner finds 
he cannot balance his expenditure, the native labourer suffers.’54
Low African wages were not restricted to the margins of base mineral 
mining, however, and were also central to the profitability of the monopolistic 
producers. The low level of mining costs made possible by low black wages 
enabled chrome and asbestos to be competitive in world markets despite 
Southern Rhodesia’s disadvantageous geographical position. When demand 
slackened and prices fell during the Great Depression, chrome and asbestos 
were able to retain their competitiveness not only through monopolistic control 
and marketing, but also through further reductions in African wages. In 1931 
for example, wages were cut on the large asbestos mines and by 1933 further 
reductions, combined with the piecework system, obliged Africans to work 
seven weeks for 30s.55
The Great Depression had seen Southern Rhodesia’s chrome and asbestos 
industries achieve and consolidate a structure which was to persist virtually 
unchanged beyond the 1950s.56 This structure and sophisticated marketing 
organisation afforded both a valuable degree of protection from the vagaries 
of world demand and equally enabled the predominant producers to fight 
off renewed competition both within and without Southern Rhodesia.
soS138/40, Assistant NC, Urungwe, to NG, Sinoia, 30.iii.1927.
siN9/4/42, NG, Lomagundi, report for March 1922.
52S235/503, NC, Lomagundi, report for year 1925; S235/505, Assistant NC, Urungwe, 
report for year 1927.
saPiece work and accidents were inter-related and both were a consequence of the in­
dustry’s profitability constraints. Workers had to excavate a fixed amount of chrome 
before their tickets were marked and as a result ‘Natives who discover a rich deposit 
of chrome are loath to leave it merely because the ground above them may cave in '; 
seeS235/504, NC, Lomagundi, report for year 1926.
5»Ibid.
5sS235/509, NC, Mashaba, report for year 1931; S235/511, NC, Mashaba, report for 
year 1933.
5 e For penetration by American capital in the late 1940s and early 1950s, see Phimister, 
‘History of Mining’.
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